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AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES: PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW NOTES 
By R.H.Green
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls
- Gilbert and Sullivan
To ask the wrong questions 
is halfway to getting 
the wrong answers.
- Apologies to V.I.Lenin
I
What We Do Not Know
This is an area in which we all think we know something. There are several 
problems. What different people - even among ourselves - think they know 
conflicts not merely as to projection and cause but as to present and 
past objective reality. Schematically:
a. how correct are our perceptions as to objective reality?
b. how clear, logically adequate, operationally oriented and correct
are our causal perceptions?
c. to what extent are our trend perceptions overweighted by the recent
past (possibly somewhat lagged recent past)?
d. how safe is it to generalize from particular perceptions? nationally? 
cross-country? as to problems? as to causes?
e. why do our (some of our) perceptions differ radically from those of
other observers/participants? (We are right and they are wrong is 
not an adequate answer - even when and if it is a valid one at some 
level!)
The fragmentary evidence suggests that there is very substantial diversity 
in trend rates of growth of food output, degree and nature of Pood shortages,
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institutional and price managements. The "conventional perceptions" - 
greatly enhanced by last two to three years - tend to blur these differences 
which may be useful for arousing concern but may have limits as to analytical 
or operational cutting edge.
Food Shortages
In most of the countries (Zimbabwe is an exception) there have been in 1980 
and 1981 food shortages in the sense that preferred staple foodstuffs were 
unavailable or available only at abnormally high prices for extended periods. 
There are longer term problems of shortages of specific foods - eg vegetable 
oil, sugar, milk - and of inadequate nutritional standards (calorific and 
makeup). Related to the short term and specific commodity problems is sub­
stantial - at least in 1980/82 - dependence on imports. Zimbabwe fits 
this model only on dietary inadequacy - as of 1981 - though as recently as 
1979/80 it had a staple food deficit (and imports) and historically it has 
usually not been self sufficient in wheat. Zambia appears in 1981 to have 
a physical, but immobile, maize surplus and a real maize shortage partly 
covered by imports.
Beyond that level of generality there are decided differences. In one or 
two cases (eg Tanzania, Kenya) one year of good weather would wipe out the 
immediate staple shortages and then allow (at least in quantities available 
to store if storage capacity existed and were properly used)reserves for 
two poor crop years. In others (eg Mozambique, Ethiopia) the situation 
seems to be structurally more difficult while yet others (eg Botswana,
Zambia - which are not themselves similar) appear to be more complex.
Further divergences include:
a. efficiency of "famine" (drought) relief;
b. whether anyone (and if so how many) is starving or on the borderline 
of starvation;
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c. whether shortages mean absence of staple or only of preferred staple 
food;
d. number of specific "secondary" food deficits.
Eg, in Tanzania drought (emergency rural) food relief (in kind) is relatively 
efficient. Nobody is starving and there seems to be no evidence of hunger 
related morbidity increases. (There ^s endemic calorie and protein deficiency 
ill health and child-morbidity). In general one or more staples have been 
available at or near "official" prices (or normal for those with no "set" 
prices) but not necessarily those buyers preferred. Cooking oil, sugar 
and milk have been very short supply.
Food Production Trends
It is not clear that there is a general pattern. Relatively bad weather 
in 1979-80-81 in several countries has given the appearance of such a pattern. 
The relatively shoddy (because underlying data are shoddy) FAO figures for 
Africa do support this impression but that may be circular.
a. Ethiopia has had shortages for a decade. (Pre 1974 famine deaths and
grain exports). This suggests low production growth but this may be 
related to war and/or be in part a faulty interpretation of procurement 
and transport problems.
b. Kenya has had at least two years of relatively poor harvests (1980 very
poor). Before that the recorded trend was near population growth. 1980 
experience was exacerbated by changes in crop payment (ie de facto 
weather insurance) and unit price policy as well as by storage and 
reserve "use" factors.
c. Tanzania has recorded (1964-1979) food production growth trend of 5%
a year. The usefulness of this is limited by very poor articulation
among products (partly a price and partly a broader crop development 
issue) and by fantastically bad storage. (Even if actual is 4% versus
the 5% recorded the problem would not turn on overall production trend). 
Since the early 1970's the former (unusual? historic?) pattern of alter­
nate good and bad years has broken down ie 1973-74 bad, 1975-76 normal 
to good, 1977-78 good, 1979 poor, 1980 very poor, 1981 poor, creating 
additional problems for inter-year management (including at household 
- ie grower household - level where one year's reserve was fairly wide­
spread) .
Zambia apparently has low growth trend but also a very erratic one. 
Random inspection suggests maize shortage/glut swings cannot easily 
be related either to price policy or to weather.
Botswana has a relatively low ratio of staple food self sufficiency 
except in good years, relatively high swings related to rainfall (and, 
with a lag,to changes in RSA export prices?) and relatively low growth. 
Here there is no protection for local production against "dumped"
RSA grain and no serious, articulated Ministry of Agriculture concern 
with crop (as opposed to cattle) production or marketing.
Mozambique lacks post 1973 data with any pretence to comprehensiveness 
and accuracy. There has been bad weather. Urban demand has grown 
sharply (higher incomes). The shift from large settler farms to state 
farms (in an attempt to defend existing market oriented production) 
has not been succesful overall. There are shortages. What production 
trends in household and co-operative (or other form?) sub-sectors 
may be is unclear.
Zimbabwe has moved from temporary (war-drought) shortages into surpluses 
at a level creating major transport/storage problems. Assuming 1981 
is not an isolated peak, there is a trend growth (over a decade) above 
population growth. However, it is concentrated on a very small 
proportion of landholdings - the majority of peasant farmers output 
has been relatively stagnant and on the ’’reserves" it is hard to see 
how this can be changed dramatically.
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Institutional Questions - Existential
There is need to map out the actual parameters in a number of areas which 
can loosely be described as institutional. This is quite apart from analysing 
or recommending - we first need much clearer, and more accurate, perception 
of what is.
Eg there is a wide spread perception of a large communal food sector in 
Tanzania. It is in fact perhaps 3% of output/acreage/time/inputs. Are 
there similar misperceptions as to scale of Mozambique state farm sector - 
especially in relation to total output?
Further, there is a need to separate formal from real channels. Eg in 
Tanzania virtually all smallholder (and for that matter village communal) 
paddy/rice has become privatized whereas up to early 1970's it had shifted 
to virtually all via a Crop Authority. (The reasons relate to shifts in 
price structure from ex-farm paddy to retail rice relativities). This not 
only makes NMC purchases no guide to production or even commercial sales 
but also means that the impression of a centralized rice procurement/ 
marketing structure relates only to large farm (basically parastal) and 
imported rice.
Some of the areas needing data/description are:
a. prices - official? At what levels (and places eg Kenya and Tanzania 
"farmgate" used to mean very different places in terms of distance 
from peasant)? For what crops? What data on private (legal, informal, 
’parallel') market prices? How set and by whom at what time effective 
when?
b. seeds - what research, by whom, on what crops? How turned into seeds 
(ie from test seed to semi-bulk to commercial)? How distributed?
Whether subsidized? How widely used?
c. inputs - patterns of research, production, distribution, use? How
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diverse are they by crop? Area? Sub-sector (eg Zambia 'line of rail' 
and Zimbabwe 'settler' farmers at one extreme and Zimbabwe 'reserve' 
peasants at the other, but also 'in between' clusters)?
d. procurement - who? What levels? How near grower? Paid in cash? How 
promptly?
e. transport - by whom? How many breaks (ie farm to village to regional 
depot to main stores to use is rarely one trip or one haulier)? How 
efficient (in cost, in use of vehicle, in getting full backhaul)?
General adequacy in terms of timing, quantity?
f. research - on what? By whom? How closely linked to local testing?
Under conditions analogous to those confronting peasants? What 
economic viability testing? Farm management? Technical quality? 
Continuity? Integration into agricultural institutions and policy?
Links to extension? To agricultural education?
g. extension - similar questions to research.
h. credit - sources? Volume? Cost? Relevance to food crops? If 
relevant for which sub-groups of farmers? Relevance to procurement- 
transport-storage? Links to extension and input supply (if any)?
Some "indices" of total recurrent expenditure (including subsidies on inputs), 
personnel (including research and crop bodies beyond central government ambit), 
credit (including food procurement/transport/storage/marketing) are needed.
These may suggest very substantial resources (eg Tanzania research-extension- 
input subsidies-other services to agriculture seem to come to 5% of total sector 
contribution to GDP; 40% of commercial bank credit is for agricultural 
marketing and over 20% for food crop - at least on face of it) but also 
questionable value for money. Data to compare industrial/export and food crop 
magnitudes of output/export and food crop magnitudes of output, input, credit, 
expenditure are also needed. It is not clear that the impression of 
concentration on export/industrial crops vs food is accurate (eg in Tanzania
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it is a travesty of reality as far as Tanzanian resources are concerned 
albeit certain foreign enclave programmes on tea, tobacco, cotton were 
'tolerated' and occasionally given second level priority backing). To call 
food "subsistence" and export "cash" is an example of false perception - 
in some countries at least (eg Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia) the 
amjority of farmers derive bulk of agricultural produce cash income from 
food crops ie maize is commonest cash crop (albeit not the largest total 
value).
What Do We Cover?
Do we limit ourselves to grain? Is so why? And of grain do we avoid the 
"World Bank/FAO fallacy" of concentrating on maize over traditional drought 
resistant (eg Millet, sorghum)? If we cover millet/sorghum why not cover 
casava and (where significant) bananas (cooking) and (irish or sweet) 
poratoes? Are rice and wheat true staples? In what sense?
If we go further how much further? Sugar, cooking oil (oilseeds), milk, 
beans, eggs, poultry, fish, meat (including goat?), bananas (eating), onions 
tomatoes, oranges, mangos, cabbage (and relatives), tea/coffee (where 
developed for local market) would appear rational. But what of data on 
output? Prices (retail, wholesale, ground)? Channels? For all except 
sugar, tea/coffee these tend to be either absent, shaky or very incomplete 
(eg queries of rural researchers, residents suggest most cattle which die 
other than of eg anthrax are eaten and if of old age meat often sold locally 
This is not consistent with GDP or nutrition figures. Does it matter for 
our purposes. Why? Why not?)
In general all data need notes on how compiled (now and in past as basis 
has often changed one to three times since 1960). These should indicate 
probable biases:
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a. trend
b. absolute
c. year to year (eg plausible trend could be linked with underestimating 
good/overestimating poor years, ie "undue stability", as seems to be 
the case in Tanzania).
d. relative strength of constant and current price series (eg in Tanzania 
quantity series for total agricultural production is a series of 
actual data/estimates which can only be weakened in conversion to 
current price series at partly unknown - and probably underestimated - 
prices but in other cases the current price series for "marketed” 
output might be strongest).
e. What formulas are used? Why? How plausible? What are implications 
for data series? (eg in Tanzania formula assumes more or less "urban 
buy" "rural eat own", urban 5%. As the 5% was valid in early 1960's 
but 13-15% would now be more accurate, this biases "cash" food down 
and "subsistence" up, since the basic quantity series is for total 
output).
Procurement - Transport - Storage
In certain cases these appear to be greater problems than production trends 
or to have a significant causal relation to production (ie if farmer cannot 
sell crop he will presently cut or not increase production) and to shortages 
(grain 'locked' in backcountry or lost-strayed-stolen-rotten in godown last 
year feeds nobody this year).
Problems with procurement vary - by country, by crop, by locality and by year. 
Eg in Kenya there appears to be a rip off problem ie supposed "farm gate" 
price twice what small peasant actually gets. In Zambia there is a recurrent 
(annual?) problem of non-procurement at one level related to roads, bridges, 
lorries but presumably (given its recurrence year after year in precisely 
the same form) at another to lack of any serious forward procurement planning
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backed by resource allocation/mobilisation. In Tanzania procurement for 
maize-wheat-rice-sorghum-millet-beans-cassava-oilseeds by NMC was good over 
1975-78. In general NMC vehicles, buying officers and cash showed up at 
stated times at most buying points and most villages were or were near a 
buying point. (The very sharp rise in procurement in several regions eg 
Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma, Rukwa, Songea, Kigoma and, for certain food crops, 
Shinyanga, Mwanza relates substantially to the sharp improvement over the 
co-ops NMC then represented for foodstuffs). With the war impact on 
transport,and NMC1s loss of physical and financial control on cash,the 
reliability of physical pickup and the promptness of payment declined 
sharply in 1979 and 1980. Major attempts to improve it in 1981 probably 
halted the deterioration - it is less clear whether they have started a 
recovery.
Transport difficulties relate to shortages of vehicles, spares, fuel, and 
railway capacity turning on general physical shortages flowing from foreign 
exchange crises (except in Zimbabwe where they are the aftermath of the war 
period and the result of a low level South African destabilisation efforts).
In addition several special factors apply in one or more countries:
a. rundown (or literal runaway) of private lorry fleets;
b. shift of private operators from rural to urban and main road business 
(easier in a situation of excess demand and made more desirable by 
deterioration in road maintenance);
c. war/insurrection conditions and aftermaths of various kinds;
d. poor coordination of vehicle fleets leading to empty backhauls (eg lorries 
carrying fertilizer and consumer goods upcountry in Tanzania usually do not 
pick up crops from villages or towns for return haul for complex reasons 
relating to ownership, data availability, spped of turnaround, etc);
e. generally poor physical and fleet use capacities of larger public sector
operators and shortages of vehicles/spares for more efficient, newer, 
smaller (eg villages in Tanzania) ones.
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Storage problems exist at several levels. The first is household. Some 
household storage - pace the conventional unwisdom of general 30% losses - 
was effective for one year. How many households had losses/poorer storage 
is unclear. So is impact of more good and bad years in succession on 
this system. Village level storage in support of household in uneven and 
as basic holding store for "nationally procured" grain until it can be 
shipped to urban or drought relief use or to more "permanent" national 
reserve at district or regional level is next to nonexistent and totally 
ignored in at least several national plans (a gap contributed to by inter­
national "expertise").
Urban/drought relief/reserve storage needs appear to be underestimated and 
not fully met even at those levels. They are too concentrated at a few points
- increasing transport costs especially in countries with highly local 
weather in which one year's surplus area can be next year's deficit 
(eg Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania). Weird swings between "high" (silo) and 
"intermediate" (tarpaulins over concrete slabs with no building) technology 
approaches have diverted energy from the boring job of using proven godown 
and metal bin techniques to build up functional capacity.
Lost-rotten-deteriorated-stolen-strayed-eaten by rodents(varying numbers of 
legs) or insects per cents are appalling (probably substantially higher than 
household) with 15-20% estimates per year for grain in Tanzania-Zambia-Kenya 
in the late 1970’s/3 to 4% in Tanzania in the early lS70's/l to 1^% Zimbabwe 
today. In addition substantial quantities have been exported (or turned into 
poultry feed) in some years by Kenya, Zambia and Yanzania simply to avert 
spoilage when godowns were full. (Zimbabwe has been an exception on storage
- whether huge volume increase in 1981 will cause deterioration is unclear).
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Prices and Costs
Costs of procurement, transport and storage are high and rising. Part of 
this is inherent in 1973-1981 evolution of fuel, spares, vehicle prices 
(up at least 400% on average). Part relate to costs of high reserve stocks 
held for up to three years before use (admitedly not very effectively in 
some cases but interest and storage cost would remain if stocks had been 
in good order and used to meet local demand in year of bad harvest).
How much relates to bad management in general, how much to weird transport 
patterns (very noticeable in Tanzania where "move early and often" seems 
to have been NMC's 1977-80 motto), how much to storage losses, how much 
to dumping (for whatever reason) on poultry feed and export markets is less 
clear. It probably varies by country and is important in estimating what 
cost reductions could be obtained here.
Price patterns - for centrally procured and for other food crops - are 
somewhat obscure and may vary sharply by country. In Tanzania over 1972-1981 
most centrally procured food prices (ex-farmer) rose as rapidly as retail 
price index excluding food and most secondary food prices more rapidly.
Ie in food,farmer/cost of living terms of trade were static or improved; 
farmer/wagearner terms improved markedly. This is contrary to popular 
perception of what happened in Tanzania and generally. What is actual 
position in other countries. (Zimbabwe 1981 is clear case of improved 
farmer/col terms especially for wheat).
Relative price for centrally procured crops often seem to make little sense 
either in respect to return per day, supply/demand balance for the crop or 
structures from "farmgate" to "shop shelf" prices. MDB price setting in 
Tanzania over 1975-1980 created an amazing degree of irrationality (a 
technocrats' performance in this case). How typical or atypical is this?
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The criteria for setting prices are obscure. Grower incomes (relative to 
what? COL? Urban wages? Other crops?); crop supply/demand balance; foreign 
exchnge; urban food prices; overall agricultural output targets and their 
makeup by crop; breakdown for procurement and/or processing levels; random 
hunches (eg Uma Lele's "peasant go-slow " thesis)? More detailed information 
needed in respect to recent past and present (especially of recent changes 
or attempts at changes as in Tanzania 1979-81, Kenya 1980-81, Zimbabwe 
1980-81, Zambia 1980).
Urban (retail) prices seem in general to have been fixed with some view to 
breakeven but both varying shares of imports (at prices sometimes above 
and sometimes below local crops), varied treatment of food aid (eg in some 
cases sold at cost with funds used for other capital projects and in some 
used directly for famine relief), bad data on costs, slow adjustments have 
created some very substantial subsidies even where none were intended (eg 
Tanzania). Zambia and Zimbabwe have at least at some points had deliberate 
maize flour/bread subsidy policies. Subsidies, if large and on staples, are 
hard to eliminate whether intended or not because of urban COL effect (eg 
Tanzania has eliminated on sugar - which cross-subsidizes sembe- wheat, rice 
but not on maize despite a 100% 1981 increase).
Price structures between grower and retail can cause problems. Zambia, Kenya 
and Tanzania have all at times had milling margins so low as to "guarantee" 
losses (for rice for several months in Tanzania they were regative because a 
technical assistance expert had "known" one tonne of paddy yielded one tonne 
of milled rice and set structure on that basis) with the not surprising result 
of problems in flow of sembe, flour, rice even when maize, wheat, paddy 
availability is adequate.
Uniform grower prices have roused sharp controversy. In Tanzania they reduce 
the income gap of several border regions (eg Rukwa, Ruvuma in maize - Kigoma in
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beans) and - when backed by procurement - create a "vent for surplus" increase 
in production. Their removal would constitute throwing people on the scrap 
heap. However, unless they are backed by a) promotion of suitable low volume/ 
value ratio crops; b) attention to optimal markets (including exports); c) medium 
term optimal transport planning (including rail and water) they can have a sub­
stantial cost requiring either substantially higher prices from urban consumers 
or a substantial recurrent budget crop support payment.
Uniform national retail prices have less to be said for them at least in 
respect to crop surplus, outlying regions. If they are applied to these the 
result is simple - local trade (including secondary urban centres) is privatized. 
As the uniform retail price includes average transport/storage which is 
"shadow" for these regions, any competent trader can pay peasant at or above 
farm gate price and sell to consumer (or retailer) below official retail (or 
whoelsale). There is no evident gain to encouraging ("enforcing") that pattern 
as these are poorer regions and procurement/marketing have economies of scale.
Prices for drought resistant crops pose problems. Tanzania set them high and 
provided effective procurement to encourage peasants to have some production 
to eat in a drought year or sell to NMC in a good year. Three problems 
arose. The prices were too high relative to other crops ie per day return 
on cassava third to tobacco/coffee and well above actual alternative crops 
in many areas. The production additions were by farmers specializing in the 
drought resistant crops for sale (often growing some maize to eat themselves) 
not by most peasants planting a bit. In good years there was minimal urban 
demand (rural was - is - not negligible, but is met privately and locally as 
uniform retail price with transport/storage included is much higher in normal 
years) and export sales create massive losses (usually over 100% of farm gate 
price ie cheaper to buy and burn if destination otherwise is export). The 
1979-81 nominal price constancy may have eroded the first problem. The 1981 
setting of differential prices by ecological suitability for maize or drought
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resistant staple may also reduce distortions and reduce scale of inappropriate 
commercial production. The marketing problem remains (as soon as there is a 
good weather year) unless all drought relief is given in cassava - sorghum - 
millet - beans in the future (rather than predominantly in maize/sembe).
Demand
How can demand be estimated? What are we trying to measure?
a. actual consumption (local production - exports + imports + change in stocks)
per capita?
b. "normal" trend (based on what?) consumption per capita?
c. requirements for a normal, adequate diet per capita (based on what?)?
These do not yield same results - or even similar ones for some products (eg 
millet, cooking oil, sugar). "B" projections are very shaky as they are 
usually based on brief periods with sharp learning effect, food switch, urbanisa­
tion, real income rise effects not necessarily relevant to late 1970's or 1980's. 
(Eg Tanzania sugar "demand" estimate of 180,000 terms for 1980 assumes 3% per
capita increase in demand trend. It is hard to see realism of that over 1979-80).
For "secondary" and "unofficial" crops data on "a" (let alone "b"; "c" could
be done by nutritionists assuming a population estimate within 10% of accuracy) 
are lacking. In any event, data for any one crop are not independent of relative 
prices, incomes, availability, learning effect eg explosive rise of Irish 
potatoes from ca 10,000 tons 1961 to ca 150,000 tonnes 1980 in Tanzania and per
contra clear tendency of cassava to decline absolutely in Dar es Salaam
when the staples are freely available at official or non-scarcity (for non­
controlled items) prices. How does one handle - set up parameters for - this?
External Inputs: Developmental or Disintegratory?
Agriculture has been a sector in several of these countries with far above 
average absolute and relative external advice, finance, programme design and
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personnel. The macro results do not suggest that this has been outstandingly 
succesful. Many of the micro cases are even worse (eg on a quick survey 
about three quarters of really bad major agricultural sector decisions and 
programmes - and at best a tenth of reasonably good - in Tanzania over 1963 - 
1980 were taken at instance of one international agency including its local 
"subsidiaries").
This is not a case for autarchy but for identifying problems with a view to 
seeing what external inputs might actually be complementary and developmental:
a. institutionally there has been a tendency to create "domestic" units which 
are externally staffed, financed and run with no responsibility to 
local technical or political bodies - and which remain externally run 
enclaves (or more accurately bridgeheads and penetration points). The 
MDB and - to a lesser degree - Tobacco Authority in Tanzania are glaring 
examples;
b. as a direct result,domestic technical capacity has atrophied, training 
appeared less urgent and political decision takers have been less able to 
act responsibly and responsibility for bad decisions less easy to place;
c. quite serious tendencies to technocratic/managerial rule and centralisation/ 
high technology have been reinforced eg change of independent village 
settlement idea of Tanzania into de facto plantations in 1963 and of 
village chosen, village programme manager into outside chosen, outsider
to manage villages in 1975 again in Tanzania; opposition to decentralisation 
(in general and food procurement/distribution in particular) in respect 
to Tanzania and early 1970’s silo programme in Tanzania. (Tractors are 
a mixed craze - there is a wide range of views both on external and 
domestic side. But animal drawn implements and animal training get no 
sustained external backing despite verbal requests from some sources 
which feed neither cattle nor research - design - production personnel).
d. different external agencies do not coordinate well (which may be a blessing
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in view of control risks) and do not work well together when locally 
coordinated (which is an unmitigated nuisance) leading to attempts to 
parcel out regions or functions or crops (often the reverse of unpackaging).
e. external agency priorities - when enforced via the institutional 
structures cited at "a" - can result in operational policy and resource 
patterns quite out of line with stated and obviously intended priorities;
f. some external personnel's decisions have clearly been very badly wrong
- res ipsa loquitur - eg price setting in Tanzania 1976-79; Tobacco Authority 
capital programmes 1972-1980; tea development priority 1963-1974 (also 
Tanzania);
g. external personnel in research (even when in national institutions) have 
often been on two year terms which are totally inadequate either for 
sustained research programmes or building adequate contextual understanding 
in agriculture);
h. given special importance of contextual, institutional, local knowledge 
the use of expatriates in field (and above in many functions) is open to 
serious question;
i. in some countries t.a. personnel have become significant focuses of 
blatant conspicuous consumption, exchange control racketeering, corruption 
(not all personnel and not just in agriculture).
It is important to identify the differential impact of these "problems" by 
country, crop, function and period. (Country and institution on external 
side as well). From that it may be possible to draw certain ideas as to 
desirable changes eg all institutions responsible to domestic units, all 
senior expatriates selected jointly or solely by recipient country and 
responsible only to that country, serious training programmes relating to 
institutions or functions with high expatriate proportion judged primarily 
on results in terms of qualified citizens produced and in relevant posts.
In respect to SIDA,more particularly, recommendations might be appropriate:
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a. do not concentrate on production proper;
b. do provide funding for e.c.d.c. t.a. (eg from international crop research 
institutes, agricultural personnel of other developing countries);
c. examine ability to provide inputs to seed multiplication (from proven 
sample through bulk to farmer) institution building;
d. develop capacity (backed by finance) to participate in national storage 
programme design and implementation (SIDA does learn from mistakes - 
silos are unlikely to be replicated);
e. ditto in respect to transport - not so much lorries and bogeys alone as 
in the package to back institutional and physical capacity build-up 
programme which at some levels may include personnel and finance for 
training/bookeeping personnel;
f. accounting/auditing/financial management personnel for Crop (Procurement) 
Authorities - interim operational, system check and redesigning training 
personnel and studies;
g. statistical development (albeit preferably jointly with - eg - India as 
Swedish and African field level, initial recording, reporting» inter­
pretation contexts vary very widely - Indian are closer to African and 
India has the personnel but not necessarily the finance).
This list is in fact probably more than SIDA would have to spend on agriculture. 
It does - potentially - direct SIDA's mind to areas in which it has a comparative 
advantage of which tropical agricultural production proper is not one. Also it 
may help shift focus/perception from a rather narrow one on food production in 
the field/food shortage in the shop to a more vectoral and integrated one.
